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Summary 
 
Recent research has cast light on the variety of informal payments and practices that govern 
the day-to-day interactions between traders and customs agents at border posts in low-
income countries. Building on this literature, this paper draws on survey and qualitative 
evidence in an effort to explore which groups are most advantaged and disadvantaged by 
the largely informal processes and norms governing cross-border trade. We find that 
understanding variation in strategies and outcomes across traders can only be effectively 
understood with reference to the importance of norms, networks, power, and the logic of 
control. 
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been growing interest in research capturing the dynamics of ‘real’ 
governance in low-income and fragile contexts. Governance practices in peripheral regions 
of low-income countries often diverge dramatically from statutory rules, with actual 
governance often representing a hybrid of formal rules and informal practices that are often 
highly normalised and widely accepted.1 Any understanding of the prospects for institutional 
or policy reform in these areas needs to begin from a clear understanding of these realities. 
 
Several recent studies have focused on these informal governance practices in the context of 
cross-border trade and the implications for state authority in border regions, often referred to 
as ‘peripheral’ or ‘liminal’ spaces in relation to the state.2 This body of research, in addition to 
providing in-depth insights into a broad range of border practices and institutions, has 
demonstrated the ways in which everyday economic practices fail to correspond to the 
‘image’ or the ‘idea’ of the state,3 but rather result in ‘practical norms’ that differ from official 
rules and regulations.4  
 
Much of this literature focuses on informal cross-border trade writ large, including unrecorded 
trade of licit goods involving the evasion of customs duties and regulations.5 This paper 
draws on the rich insights offered from this broader body of literature in order to focus on two 
comparatively discrete questions to better understand the nature of informal payments that 
are made by cross-border traders through formal trade routes, and the nature of traders’ 
engagement of informal brokers, known in Krio as chata men.6 First, what explains the 
prevalence of informal payments and informal brokers at border crossings? Existing research 
offers a wide variety of explanations: economic rationality, the absence of trust in the state, 
the exercise of power by predatory state agents and the outcomes of information 
asymmetries, and the role of ethnic, social, or kinship networks. Second, who benefits and 
who loses from pervasive informality? Again, the literature offers a variety of potential 
hypotheses, as groups may be disadvantaged based on their relative political and economic 
position, their ethnic or political identities, or the strength of their social, economic or political 
networks. Exploring these alternative explanations has important implications for 
understanding the foundations of local governance in border transactions, the nature of 
state-society relations in peripheral areas, and the potential for reform that is more aligned 
with local realities. 
 
To address these questions, we investigate trader experiences at the two most important 
land borders in Sierra Leone: Gbalamuya, on the northern border with Guinea, and 
Gendema (Bo-Waterside), on the southern border with Liberia. These cases offer relevant 
variation in terms of the volume and type of trade, political and ethnic identities, and the 
relative degree of remoteness from the central state.  
 
We use a mixed methods approach for understanding economic activity in border regions 
where the ‘complexity is best addressed by a multifaceted approach’.7 We combine a 
relatively small survey of traders with focus groups with both traders and chata men and in-
depth interviews with key stakeholders and border officials.8 The greatest barrier to research 
                                                 
1  Meagher 2007, 2012 and 2013; Meagher and Lindell 2013; Cleaver, Franks, Maganga and Hall 2013; Cleaver 2001; 
Olivier de Sardan 2008; Titeca and Flynn 2014. 
2  E.g. Raeymaekers 2014. 
3  Migdal and Schlicte 2005: 15. 
4  Olivier de Sardan 2008; Titeca and de Herdt 2010 and 2011. 
5  See e.g. Golub 2012 and 2015. 
6  Derived from the English ‘charter’ men and referring to informal (e.g. unregistered) trade brokers.  
7  Ellis and MacGaffey 1996: 25.  
8  We administered a survey among 96 and 101 cross-border traders on the Sierra Leonean sides of the Gendema and 
Gbalamuya border posts, respectively. This sample size allows us to reliably distinguish responses that vary by at least 
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of this kind lies in being able to secure credible responses from traders and officials; we have 
confidence in our results for two primary reasons: coherence between information gathered 
through different methods, and the fact that we have been able to draw on trusting and 
respectful existing relationships between the local research team and research participants.9 
 
Seeking to disentangle alternative explanations of the prevalence and nature of informal 
payments does not point toward some explanations that are ‘right’, and others than are 
‘wrong’. Instead, it underlines the need for a highly contextualised understanding of the 
dynamics of informal border practices. Individual traders do not face a black and white 
decision between ‘formality’ and ‘informality’; indeed, informal practices are sometimes 
intertwined and indistinguishable from formal ones.10 Instead, the systems governing informal 
payments in cross-border trade are inescapable, highly normalised, and sometimes 
institutionalised, with individuals correspondingly facing decisions not about whether to 
engage in these practices, but in how best to navigate these systems given their needs, 
constraints, and resources. In constructing a more nuanced understanding of the drivers and 
outcomes of informality, the roles of power dynamics, personal relationships, and of the logic 
of control emerge particularly clearly. The availability of local networks and links to border 
officials plays a particularly important role in shaping both strategies and outcomes. 
Meanwhile, those who are organised into trade associations or who engage in informal 
border management committees at the community level face the highest costs of informality, 
suggesting that the local system of informal governance is not merely economic, but serves a 
localised political role. 
 
We begin with a brief review of the literature, highlighting extant explanations of the 
pervasiveness of informal payments and brokerage in cross-border trade. We then provide a 
brief account of the functioning of customs operations at the two case border posts, before 
exploring the drivers of informal payments and brokerage, and the question of who wins and 
who loses from pervasive informality.  
 
 
1  Informality and cross-border trade 
 
Recent research has focused on capturing the ground-level reality of governance in low-
income and fragile contexts, with a subset of authors focusing on these interactions in border 
regions. As noted, this literature tends to focus on a broad set of informal practices and 
institutions within cross-border trade, including informal cross-border trade or smuggling, 
broader practices of brokerage, credit systems, and warehousing. Though our focus is much 
narrower – informal payments and informal brokerage within formal cross-border trade routes 
– the literature’s insights into informal practices and governance are particularly valuable. 
Indeed, the foundational understanding that informal governance practices should be 
understood ‘not as an absence of regulation, but as alternative forms of regulation operating 
below and beyond the framework of the state’ helps to guide our own exploration of 
                                                                                                                                                        
+/- 10 per cent. Participants were randomly selected to the extent that this was possible, though random selection 
methods were subject to realities on the ground. Most notably, it was difficult to interview traders who were crossing the 
border very quickly, while traders were consistently willing to be interviewed if they were waiting in line, waiting for 
clearing agents, or if they remained in the border town overnight.   
9  Samuel Jibao, who led the data gathering, is the former Director of Research for the National Revenue Agency in Sierra 
Leone and has since established an independent research institute. While it is possible to imagine that his former 
position could have made respondents reluctant to divulge ‘sensitive’ information, in practice his reputation for 
independence and honesty led respondents to be much more open once they knew of his involvement, while it also 
allowed for brokering frank discussion with senior government officials and notables in local communities.   
10  Indeed, the literature on ‘real’ governance practices has included substantial debate about the term ‘informal’, centring 
both on what is meant by ‘informal’ and whether this term is appropriate at all in a context in which the so-called 
‘informal’ is, in fact, widely accepted and normalised, while being highly integrated with the ‘formal’ (Meagher 1990, 
2005; Roitman 1990, 2005; Cantens 2012; Hart 2005; Klein 1999). Throughout our discussion, we recognise the 
importance of this definitional debate, using the term ‘informal’ in a relatively straightforward and value-free manner, 
simply to refer to processes that are outside of statutory legal frameworks. 
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informality within formal channels of trade.11 Informal practices more broadly often represent 
a complexity ‘of negotiation, contestation and bricolage’12 among a multiplicity of state and 
non-state actors. Through these processes state institutions and public authority are 
sustained, contested, and/or remade.13 By understanding informal payments as reflecting 
governance arrangements that are both contested and often highly normalised and 
interactive with formal institutions, this literature thus creates space for a deeper 
understanding of the prevalence of informal practices and payments within border 
economies. 
 
1.1 Causes of the prevalence of informality in cross-border trade 
 
The literature presents four primary explanations for informality within cross-border trade: 
economic rationality, lack of trust in the state, power dynamics, and the strength of ethnic, 
social, religious, or kinship networks. We consider each in turn. 
 
First, the most intuitive explanation for pervasive informality lies in economic rationality, and 
an assessment of the costs and benefits of formal versus informal economic activity,14 with 
traders engaging in informal practices in order to avoid higher taxes and bypass costly 
bureaucratic processes and non-tariff barriers to trade.15 This perspective thus sees 
informality as a ‘source of economic freedom and empowerment’ for economically 
marginalised segments of the population.16 In these contexts, informal economic activity is 
thought to be a more flexible, efficient and financially advantageous alternative to formal 
regulations, amounting to, as Klitgaard says of corruption, ‘a crime of calculation, not 
passion’.17 Consistent with this perspective, several studies of informality in cross-border 
trade highlight the roles of uncoordinated trade and economic policies (e.g. import protection 
policies, subsidies, price controls, exchange rate misalignments) and high formal tariffs and 
taxes in influencing traders’ decisions to engage in informal practices.18 These studies also 
point to other direct and indirect transaction costs that can be associated with formal trade, 
and which make circumventing formal channels of trade more attractive, particularly for 
small-scale traders.19  
 
However, other studies make it clear that the reality is frequently more complex than this 
simple economic calculus. Most notably, in at least some cases the informal ‘taxes’ traders 
may pay in lieu of formal tariffs actually increase total payments, as a result of information 
and power asymmetries in the negotiation of informal tax rates, while also increasing the 
unpredictability of individual tax payments.20 Both problems can have a disproportionately 
                                                 
11  Meagher 2008 cited in Titeca and Flynn 2014: 78; see also Meagher 2011; Meagher and Lindell 2013. 
12  Hagmann and Péclard 2010: 544. 
13  Titeca and Flynn 2014; Titeca 2012; Titeca and de Herdt 2011; Cleaver et al. 2013; Roitman 2004 and 2005; Lund 
2006. 
14  Benjamin and Mbaye 2012; Perry, Maloney, Arias, Fajnzylber, Mason and Saavedra 2007; Kanbur 2009; Djankov, 
Lieberman, Mukherjee and Nenova 2003; Loayza, Oviedo and Serven 2005; Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan and 
Woodruff 2000. 
15  This follows rationalist perspectives of corruption, wherein corruption is viewed as ‘instrumentally profitable’ in the 
context of scarcity, disorder or an inequitable political environment. (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 106; see also Sindzingre 
2002; Popkin 1979). Aidt describes this as ‘efficient corruption’, allowing individuals to work around misguided 
government policies and red tape. (Aidt 2003; see also Leff 1964; Lui 1985; Beck and Maher 1986).   
16  Roitman 2004: 32. 
17  Klitgaard 1988: 46. 
18  See e.g. Ackello-Ogutu and Echessah 1998; Macamo 1999; Levin and Widell 2007; Waseem 2013; Akinboade and 
Kinfack 2012; Gajigo and Hallward-Driemeier 2012; Ogra and Kundu 2011; Levy 2008; Golub 2015; Boone 1989; Berg 
1985; Egg and Herrera 1998; Golub and Mbaye 2009; Oyejide, Ademola, Ogunkola, Bankole and Adwuyi 2008; 
Benjamin, Golub and Mbaye 2015; Ellis and MacGaffey 1996. 
19  See e.g. Yoshino, Ngungi and Asebe 2012; OECD 2002; Lesser and Moisé-Leeman 2009; see also de Soto 1989 and 
2000. For example, burdensome, non-transparent, inflexible, or otherwise inappropriate formal regulations, including 
technical regulations or health and phytosanitary standards, may induce traders and small businesses to develop 
alternative, non-statutory solutions that circumvent official channels and regulations to function (e.g. Lourenço-Lindel 
2004; Ackello-Ogutu and Echessah 1997 and 1998; Minde and Nakhumwa 1998; Muwulya 2013; Brenton, Bashinge 
Bucekuderhwa, Hossein, Nagaki and Ntagoma  2012).   
20  Amin and Hoppe 2013; Brenton et al. 2012; Yoshino et al. 2012; Titeca with Kimanuka 2012; OECD 2002. 
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negative impact on small-scale traders.21 Meanwhile, research elsewhere indicates that 
reducing the costs of formality is frequently not sufficient to encourage informal firms to 
formalise.22 These more complex economic realities point toward the need to consider 
additional factors in explaining informal payments.    
 
A second set of arguments has correspondingly focused on the possibility that traders may 
be more likely to engage in informality and circumvent formal trade channels and tax 
payments when they do not trust the state or view it as lacking legitimacy.23 A wide range of 
survey research has found that levels of trust in the state, satisfaction with public services 
and perceptions of fairness in the tax system can powerfully influence tax morale and 
compliance.24 Case studies of cross-border trade have echoed this message.25 As Cantens 
and Raballand describe, ‘State representatives overvalue local populations’ acceptance of 
the rule of law and consider the State’s presence at borders as “natural”, which does not 
necessarily chime with the local population’s point of view.’26 It is thus possible that traders 
may evade formal payments, as a form of political rebellion or protest against the state; a 
political ‘weapon of the weak’, and not simply a matter of economic survival.27 
 
Again, however, existing research suggests greater complexity, with informality more 
generally understood as being opposed neither to the state or formal economic activity. As 
Roitman argues, the relationship between the formal and informal realms can be highly 
ambiguous, ‘often reciprocal and complicitous as much as they are competitive and 
antagonistic’.28 Indeed, the ‘practical norms’ that develop around informal practices and 
payments are formed through continuous negotiation between formal and informal rules, 
involving a multiplicity of state and non-state actors.29  
 
These first two explanations may be problematic as they assume that traders have autonomy 
to decide how they interact with, or disengage from, the formal rules. Recent studies 
emphasise, however, that in many contexts informal practices are critically shaped by local 
dynamics of power.30 There is often no option to opt out of informal payments or practices, 
particularly for marginalised segments of the population, who are likely to be particularly 
disadvantaged by the information and power asymmetries that characterise cross-border 
trade.31  
 
Finally, social, economic, religious, or kinship networks and personal relationships may 
provide incentives to engage in informality.32 Ethnic, religious and kinship ‘networks play a 
large role in organising the informal sector, and are particularly important in [informal cross-
border trade] given that their populations often straddle national borders’,33 themselves 
artificial, inherited, and porous concepts.34 Social or identity networks and relationships may 
                                                 
21  Amin and Hoppe 2013; Titeca with Kimanuka 2012; Schomerus and Titeca 2012; Tegera and Johnson 2007; Brenton et 
al. 2012. 
22  La Porta and Shleifer 2014. 
23  Dzaka-Kikouta 2004; Ayadi, Benjamin, Bensassi and Raballand 2013; Tegara and Johnson 2007; Golub 2015. 
24  Cummings, R., Martinez-Vazquez, J., McKee, M. and Torgler, B. 2005; Torgler 2004; Gibson and Hoffman 2005; 
Fjeldstad 2004; Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001; Ali, Fjeldstad and Sjursen 2013; Jibao and Prichard 2014; Addison and 
Murshed 2001; Smart 2013; Golub 2015. 
25  Morini 2013; Muwulya 2013; Farré 2013; Ayadi et al. 2013; Titeca and Flynn 2014; Titeca and de Herdt 2010. 
26  Cantens and Raballand 2017.  
27  Scott 1987.  
28  Roitman 2004: 131; see also Cantens 2012; Meagher 1990; Meagher and Lindell 2013; Roitman 1990 and 2005. 
29  Titeca and Flynn 2014; Titeca 2012. This illustrates the analytical value of ‘hybridity’, which moves away from a state-
centric framework, while at the same time emphasising the increasing lack of value in the concept of ‘informality’ itself 
(see e.g. Titeca and Flynn 2014; Hart 2005; Klein 1999; Meagher 2005; Roitman 2005; Cantens 2012; Portes 1994). 
30  This parallels Olivier de Sardan’s view of corruption as socially embedded within ‘the logics of predatory authority’. 
Olivier de Sardan 1999.  
31  Tegara and Johnson 2007; Titeca with Kimanuka 2012; Cantens 2012. 
32  Médard 2002: 379; see also Brass and Krackhardt 2012: 355; Golub 2015. 
33  Golub 2015; Golub and Hansen-Lewis 2012; Little 2005; Meagher 2010a; MacGaffey 1991; Igué and Solué 1992; 
Hashim and Meagher 1999; Mahmood 2008; Kabamba 2013; Titeca 2009; Aker, Klein, O’Connell and Yang 2014. 
34  Golub 2015; see also Young 1994. 
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encourage informality through the behavioural or social pressures of negotiation, exchange, 
redistribution, and reciprocity,35 or through the enabling of ‘rational commercial organization 
and cooperation’.36 As described by Walther, the capacity of ‘social actors’ to cross the 
border ‘depends very much on their social network, in particular the informal ties they 
maintain with state representatives, which ensure that crossing borders will not be too costly, 
lengthy and risky’.37 Networks may serve as forms of positive ‘social capital’, playing an 
important role in overcoming transaction costs created by information asymmetries.38 
 
1.2 Winners and losers of pervasive informality 
 
While the literature has thus explored the factors that may explain the pervasiveness of 
informality, it also makes clear that different segments of the population are likely to 
experience informality in diverse ways. Powerful individuals and groups shape the ‘practical 
norms’ defining informal practices and systems of ‘real governance’,39 raising the likelihood 
that the political economy of informality will be simultaneously exploited (by the powerful) and 
exploitative (to the vulnerable). While again addressing broader practices of informality, 
insights from this literature are relevant to understanding the effects and burdens of informal 
payments within formal cross-border trade. Who bears the heaviest burden – whether 
economic, social, psychological, or physical – of informal payments? Who is able to use 
these payments to their advantage?  
 
The most evident possibility is that vulnerable segments of the population may be at a 
disadvantage within informal transactions and regulatory networks, owing to their lack of 
negotiating power. In this way informal payments may amount to economic discrimination 
against vulnerable groups, with small-scale, unorganised or otherwise vulnerable traders 
shouldering a disproportionate economic burden relative to their income.40 In addition to 
economic discrimination, vulnerable groups, including migrants and women, may also be 
particularly vulnerable to various forms of harassment by border officials.41 However, the 
literature also points to ways in which the story may be more complex. Research has 
documented the existence of local moral economies around taxation, which may sometimes 
provide critical tax exemptions and relief for vulnerable segments of the population, including 
the disabled or the elderly.42 Moreover, the role of collective action is often seen as a way to 
mediate power differentials: policy-oriented research often calls for the strengthening of 
informal networks and associations.43 However, the reality of organising may be complex in 
practice. Informal associations may be internally unrepresentative and undemocratic,44 while 
their social and legal marginality and their vulnerability to capture by opportunistic leaders 
may prevent them from becoming effective local voices.45  
 
Existing accounts also make clear that the exercise of power is likely to be mediated through 
ethnic, social, religious, or kinship networks and personal connections. Just as these 
networks may shape traders’ decisions about whether to engage in informality, research 
suggests that such networks may also lead to better outcomes in a wide range of public 
service transactions.46 Indeed, because practical norms are often shaped by powerful actors, 
traders with strong social or identity networks, traders with connections to border officials, or 
                                                 
35  Olivier de Sardan 1999.  
36  Meagher 2010a: 169; see also Meagher 1990; Curtin 1971; Austen 1987; Hopkins 1973; Raeymaekers 2010; Kinyanjui 
2013. 
37  Walther 2015. 
38  Rauch 2001; Barron, Field, and Schuller 2000.  
39  Olivier de Sardan 2008; Cantens 2012; Ogra and Kundu 2011. 
40  Cleaver et al. 2013; Schomerus and Titeca 2012; Titeca 2011. 
41  Flynn 1997; Amin and Hoppe 2013; Schomerus and Titeca 2012; Titeca with Kimanuka 2012; Brenton et al. 2012. 
42  Titeca with Kimanuka 2012; Titeca 2012; Prichard and van den Boogaard 2017. 
43  Tripp 2001: 10; Carr and Chen 2004; Chen, Vanek and Heintz 2006; Horn 2003; ILO 2002; Lund and Skinner 2004. 
44  Joshi and Ayee 2008; Prichard 2010; Meagher and Lindell 2013. 
45  Meagher 2010a and b; Thulare 2004: 17; Shefner 2006; Miltin 2001; Beall 2001; Horn 2003. 
46  Titeca 2012; Roitman 1990; Twijnstra, Hilhorst and Titeca 2014; Fjeldstad 2001. 
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with political or economic influence may be more likely to receive preferential treatment in 
border transactions.47 Correspondingly, certain groups may be particularly disadvantaged by 
their lack of networks: research suggests that ‘outsiders’ – be they foreigners or domestic 
migrants – may be more likely to face harassment or discriminatory tax treatment within 
border transactions.48 This reflects an understanding of the complex nature of networks with 
respect to informal practices more generally, with social networks either viewed as 
strengthening flexibility, coordination and economic efficiency in the context of state or 
market failure,49 or alternatively as being associated with economic decline and 
socioeconomic inequality.50 
 
 
2  The day-to-day reality of cross-border trade 
in Sierra Leone 
 
Recorded intra-African trade flows are consistently low, with only about 10 per cent of total 
African exports and imports accounted for through official intra-African trade.51 This situation 
is reflected in West Africa, despite the Mano River Union and the Economic Community of 
West African States regional trading agreements.  
 
However, these official statistics are very misleading. As indicated elsewhere, unrecorded 
trade in West Africa ‘vastly exceeds reported bilateral trade’.52 Informal, or unrecorded, 
cross-border trade is prevalent throughout Africa, with important socioeconomic impacts, 
including income and employment generation.53 Since the creation of artificial national 
boundaries, the border regions of Sierra Leone have been sites of informal trade and activity. 
Gendema, for instance, is recognised as a ‘traditional smuggling centre’, indicating a 
longstanding history of informality in border practices more generally.54 The long-term 
development impact of informality within cross-border trade is also significant, particularly in 
terms of the losses to national revenue.  
 
Different manifestations of informality are pervasive within the border regions of study. For 
instance, informal customs clearance agents, known as chata men, serve as important 
brokers between traders and customs agents in this region of West Africa.55 These 
intermediaries are ‘informal’ or ‘unofficial’ insofar as they operate without licences and/or the 
identification necessary to lodge a declaration. These informal agents are involved in 
processing documents, negotiating customs rates with border agents, making formal and 
informal payments to border actors, and/or carrying or driving goods across the border. The 
complex landscape of cross-border trade also includes other non-state actors who facilitate 
customs clearance, including drivers and ‘loaders’. 
                                                 
47  Farré 2013; Twijnstra et al. 2014; Titeca 2012; Raeymaekers 2010; Lourenço-Lindell 2004. This accords with the view 
of politics and informal institutions in Africa being more personalised than in places with formalised systems of rule – 
what is often referred to as the ‘Big Man rule’ (Hyden 2012: 97; see also Daloz 2003; Price 1974; Jackson and Rosberg 
1982; Lentz 1998). 
48  See e.g. Juul 2006; Flynn 1997; Amin and Hoppe 2013; Schomerus and Titeca 2012; Titeca with Kimanuka 2012; 
Brenton et al. 2012. 
49  See e.g. Stiglitz 2000; Powell 1991; Granovetter 1995; MacGaffey 1991; Hansen and Vaa 2004; World Bank 1989; 
Fafchamps and Minten 1999; Fafchamps 2004.  
50  Castells 1996; Roitman 2004; Chabal and Daloz 1999.  
51  Keane, Calì and Kennan 2010; see also Berg 1985; Yeats 1990.  
52  Golub 2015. 
53  Cantens and Raballand 2017; Amin and Hoppe 2013; Ayadi et al. 2013; Brenton et al. 2012; Golub and Hansen–Lewis 
2012; Benjamin et al. 2015; Lesser and Moisé-Leeman 2009; Little 2005; Teka and Azeze 2002; Ndlela 2006; Mijere 
2009; Macamo 1999; Ackello-Ogutu and Echessah 1997; MacGaffey 1991; Kabamba 2013; Titeca 2009; Titeca and de 
Herdt 2010; Roitman 2004; Amin and Hoppe 2013; Igué and Soulé 1992; Azam 2007; Golub 2012; Hashim and 
Meagher 1999; Galtier and Tassou 1998; Golub and Mbaye 2009; Chalfin 2001; Afrika and Ajumbo 2012; Roitman 2004 
54  Keen 2005: 49. 
55  The use of semi-official intermediaries is common elsewhere. Benjamin and Mbaye 2012.  
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Adding to this complexity are unofficial customs employees or ‘volunteers’, who are not well-
trained or regulated and who are paid through ‘goodwill’ payments or other informal tax 
contributions in a quasi-institutionalised manner. The obvious incentives for informal 
extraction from traders are amplified by pressures placed on these ‘volunteers’ by customs 
officials both at the border posts and at headquarters to remit the ‘tips’ or ‘dash’ that are 
received at the border. Overall, the complexity of this landscape, transposed over numerous 
layers of security forces, border agents, regulatory agents, and customs officials, offers 
ample opportunity for private rent seeking.56  
 
At the same time, however, we find evidence of informal exemptions being negotiated 
between customs officials and local communities, in an attempt to balance the dual demands 
of revenue collection and trade facilitation. Indeed, informally organised joint border 
management committees, involving traditional authorities, traders, and other stakeholders, 
have come to informal, ad hoc agreements with border officials to exempt small-scale traders 
living in the local communities from customs duties for goods staying within the communities. 
While these goods may be ‘duty free’, they are not exempt from informal taxes within this 
broader context of informality, as traders face a range of different payments, constituting a 
mix of official and unofficial payments that permeate and exist alongside or with the support 
of formal institutions and practices in an often institutionalised manner. Table 1 reports 
survey responses about the prevalence of informal payments and practices. Border officials 
themselves corroborated the prevalence of informal ‘taxes’. For instance, one border official 
explicitly showed us the stacks of bills that were kept in his office for the government, and the 
stacks that were kept for himself. Another border official noted that, no matter the amount of 
revenue collected, it would be foolish to give the government revenue in excess of the set 
targets. Doing so, he claimed, would only lead to an increase in the target, eating away at 
personal profits.  
 
As elsewhere, the rates of informal taxes are ‘partly fixed by precedent and partly 
negotiated’,57 and may be made to a range of state and non-state actors stationed at the 
border and along trade routes, including to customs officers, police or immigration officers, 
representatives from a range of state ministries and agencies, and unofficial customs 
employees or ‘volunteers’. Direct informal taxes include: ‘document acceleration’ or 
‘facilitation’ fees, explicitly paid to expedite the customs clearance process, and ‘goodwill’ 
payments, otherwise known as ‘tips’, ‘gifts’, ‘dash’, or ‘cold water’. The latter differ from 
acceleration fees as they are not tied to an immediate desired outcome, but are rather used 
as a means of maintaining strong relationships with border actors and more predictable 
future outcomes at the border. Border actors may also demand that ‘samples’ of product/s be 
given, ostensibly for quality inspection, though often as a form of informal in-kind tax. Traders 
may pay these informal ‘taxes’ whether or not they go through formal border channels, pay 
formal customs duties, or bypass state regulations altogether.58 We consider these payments 
related to but distinct from corruption, in line with Prud’homme, who defines informal taxation 
as ‘the nonformal means utilised to finance the provision of public goods and services’.59 This 
includes what Prud’homme defines as ‘public informal taxation’, including ‘pinch’, as a form 
of salary supplementation, or ‘extortion’, both of which may be considered to provide a public 
good in so far as ‘governments provide, at an absolute low point, law and order. Without the 
means to survive, officials could not perform this duty’.60   
 
                                                 
56  Bako-Arifari 2001; Brenton et al. 2012; Titeca with Kimanuka 2012. 
57  Golub 2015: 186; see also Titeca with Kimanuka 2012; Roitman 2007; Titeca and Flynn 2014; Reyntjens 2014. 
58  Accordingly, we observe how economic activities, actors and payments may exist within both formal and informal 
realms, reflecting Roitman’s (1990: 683, 685) concept of ‘straddling’ (see also Roitman 2005; Titeca 2012; Titeca with 
Kimanuka 2012; Titeca and de Herdt 2010; Amin and Hoppe 2013; Ødegaard 2008; Chen 2006; Prag 2013; Meagher 
1990; Meagher and Lindell 2013; Cleaver et al. 2013; Cantens, Kaminski, Raballand, and Tchouawou 2014).  
59  Prud’homme 1992: 2. 
60  Prud’homme 1992. 
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Finally, the informal negotiation of formal customs rates between frontline customs officials 
and traders or their representatives (i.e. chata men) is very common. Negotiation generally 
occurs on a case-by-case basis, though for larger-scale traders in Gbalamuya these 
negotiations may be more formalised, with minimum duty values set according to the size of 
the transporting vehicle – though even then traders often reported paying more than 
prescribed minimums, though less than statutory rates.61   
 
Table 2 Prevalence of informal practices 
 Regular 
payment of 
document 
acceleration 
fee 
Regular 
payment 
of 
goodwill 
Border officials 
sometimes or 
often request 
personal 
payments to 
have goods 
clear customs62 
Regularly 
asked to 
give 
samples 
Regular use 
of chata 
men 
Among those who regularly 
pay formal customs rate63 
% who 
regularly 
negotiate 
the 
customs 
rate64 
% for whom no 
receipt is 
given/receipt 
reflects lower 
amount than 
that paid65 
All traders 
N 197 
35% 
 
83% 
 
56% 
 
7% 
 
59% 
 
61% 
 
73% 
 
 
3  What explains the prevalence of unrecorded 
taxation and informal brokerage in cross-
border trade?  
 
Building on the literature and this understanding of the pervasiveness of informal payments 
and brokerage, we find five central and interconnected explanations as to why traders make 
informal payments and engage the services of informal brokers when crossing the border.  
 
3.1 Profit 
 
First, we explore the idea that traders make informal payments as a means to reduce overall 
costs and delays. We expect that those who believe that the costs of formal processes are 
excessively high are more likely to make informal payments or to engage the service of chata 
men who may be able to negotiate better rates for them. This is supported by descriptive 
data, as traders identify high formal costs as the dominant motivation for engaging in informal 
practices, as illustrated in Figure 1. Indeed, the top three reasons that traders gave for hiring 
chata men to clear customs and for paying ‘goodwill’, ‘tips’, or providing product samples to 
border officials (whether state or non-state actors) are ‘to avoid 100 per cent examination’, 
implying higher formal customs duties; ‘to avoid delays’ at the border; and because formal 
‘custom rates are too high’. Similarly, the top reasons given for why traders negotiate the 
formal customs rate was because ‘customs rates are too high’, ‘to avoid 100 per cent 
examination’, and because ‘customs rates are set in an unfair or discriminatory manner’.  
 
 
                                                 
61  Minimum amounts accepted by border officials reportedly ranged from 2 million Sierra Leonean Leones (Le) (US$462) 
for a six-tyre truck, Le 3 million (US$693) for a ten-tyre truck, and Le 5 million (US$1,155) for a twelve-tyre truck. 
62  N 178. 
63  N 81. 
64  While ‘regularly’ is an imprecise measure of frequency, pre-interview training with survey enumerators to ensure 
consistency of approach and a post-interview focus group discussion with survey enumerators to review our biases 
leaves us confident that interviewees loosely interpreted ‘regularly’ to mean ‘more often than not’ for all relevant survey 
questions. 
65  In line with foundational research in this field (Titeca with Kimanuka 2012), we consider the non-issuance of tax 
receipts, or the issuance of a receipt reflecting a lower amount than the tax paid, as evidence of informal negotiation or 
the levying of an informal tax. 
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Figure 1 Reasons for engaging in informality 
 
Traders themselves reported paying on average 2.7 per cent of the value of the goods they 
carry across the border in informal payments, while estimating that, if they were to pay official 
rates, formal payments would amount to an average of 7 per cent of the total value of 
goods.66 Despite the imprecise nature of these self-reported and estimated values,67 the 
overall data is consistent with the notion that, for the average trader, ‘savings’ on formal rates 
through the payment of informal taxes, the negotiation of formal rates, or the employment of 
informal clearing agents to negotiate these rates on their behalf are likely to outweigh the 
total amount of informal payments made. It is clear, therefore, that both traders and border 
officials benefit economically from informal payments made through formal border channels. 
 
Our observations at the border posts in question further support the economic rationale for 
making informal payments. For example, larger traders that are entwined within broader 
regional trading networks commonly make use of local traders, who benefit from informal 
exemptions from customs duties, to ferry small numbers of goods across the border. 
Meanwhile, the direct and indirect costs of formal customs channels are often extremely 
burdensome given the context. For example, regulatory and documentation requirements 
(e.g. technical regulations and phytosanitary standards) often require traders, regardless of 
size, to travel to Freetown to obtain documentation from the only office in the country. From 
Gendema this is an especially onerous task given the remoteness of the border location and 
the poor state of the road, which during rainy season is only passable by motorbike. Few 
                                                 
66  The average trader in our sample reports goodwill payments of Le 33,810 (US$7.81) to multiple actors for every border 
crossing. In addition to these goodwill payments, traders who regularly give in-kind samples to border officials reported 
giving an average equivalent value of Le 85,192 (US$20) per crossing. Traders regularly paying acceleration fees to 
border officials reported paying an average payment of Le 75,525 (US$17.45), while chata men reported paying, on 
average, Le 100,000 (US$23.10) to ‘fast track’ document processing. The average value of these payments is 
calculated as the sum of acceleration fees, goodwill payments, fees for the chata man and the value of samples divided 
by the value of goods being transported. The latter are recoded in bands, and for this calculation we set the average 
value of goods being transported to the average value within the band. 
67  Ultimately, it is impossible to be certain how much traders ‘save’ by engaging in informal practices, as compared to 
formal rates, as traders themselves generally have little understanding of what formal rates should be in individual 
cases. All of these numbers should be treated as indicative rather than precise: interviews suggest that traders struggle 
to estimate with any precision the value of the goods being transported, the level of formal rates, or the precise amounts 
of past informal payments.  
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Engage chata men to help
them clear customs
Provide goodwill, tip or
samples to individuals
working at the border
Negotiate the official tax
rate with customs officials
Some traders engage in the following three practices. What do you think are the three 
main reasons why they adopt these strategies? 
To avoid '100 per cent
examination'
Customs rates are too high
Customs rates are set in an
unfair or discriminatory
manner
To avoid delays at the border
To avoid aggression or verbal
or physical altercations with
border agents
To avoid sexual harassment or
abuse by border agents
To avoid having goods
damaged
To avoid insecurity
It is the order of the day
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drivers want to cross this challenging terrain so hiring a motorbike is costly, making the 
journey so expensive as to be prohibitive to most small-scale traders.   
 
Moreover, the use of chata men is at least partially driven by economic incentives, as these 
brokers are able to fill critical information gaps. As described by Cantens and Raballand, 
‘Middlemen develop a relationship and negotiation culture with Customs’,68 providing added 
value through a capacity to coordinate transactions and minimise transaction costs.69 
Reflective of information asymmetries at the border, administrative requirements and 
processes are characterised by opacity, with access to the state limited by linguistic barriers 
(i.e. forms are written in English), poorly disseminated information about duty rates and 
trader rights, and low levels of education and confidence amongst traders. All of these 
factors combine to limit trader willingness to confront or negotiate with border actors and 
serve as a clear incentive to have a representative act on their behalf. Correspondingly, both 
traders and chata men described the latter as ensuring lower customs rates and fewer 
delays because of their knowledge of customs procedures.   
 
3.2 Power 
 
Power dynamics also figure centrally in understanding the reasons for making informal 
payments. We observed power dynamics manifested in different ways at the border posts, 
with authority wielded by both border officials and informal clearing agents. For instance, 
information asymmetries are a key source of power within the relationship between traders 
and informal brokers. As reported elsewhere, these asymmetries can result in 
misperceptions of the costs and risks of crossing the border.70 In our case studies, there is 
some evidence that chata men deliberately maintain their informational advantage at the 
border. While chata men have access to the list of formal tariffs, disaggregated by type of 
goods, this information is not easily accessible for traders. Likewise, there is evidence that 
attempts to simplify border procedures, such as through the adoption of risk-based 
assessments for the clearance of goods,71 have been limited by political pressures to stall 
transparency and simplification reform processes.72  
 
At the same time, ostentatious displays of wealth (e.g. expensive vehicles) by border officials 
can reinforce the existing power hierarchy in a context where displays of wealth signal 
authority and garner respect. These displays and the discretionary distribution of favours to 
traders create deferential relationships between border officials and traders, and patron-like 
relationships between high-level border officials and customs ‘volunteers’, with these 
volunteers working to extract informal taxes on behalf of their boss, or ‘pa’. This leads to 
situations wherein some border officials are treated with the utmost deference and, in certain 
observed cases, are even saluted by traders and informal customs employees.  
 
More generally, there is clear evidence that traders – and more vulnerable groups in 
particular – frequently have little choice in engaging in informal payments and brokerage, and 
limited leverage in negotiations, while facing high costs for deviating from accepted practices. 
Traders in focus groups commonly reported believing that they would face strong resistance 
from border officials and other traders if they were to go against ‘the order of the day’ of 
informality – for example, asking for receipts often results in threats of higher payments or 
unnecessary delays. Likewise, many traders reported that if they didn’t use chata men or 
make informal payments to border actors they would risk having their goods damaged or 
confiscated or face higher duties. In other instances, border officials create unnecessary 
delays in order to induce traders to pay acceleration fees or may exploit formal standards 
                                                 
68  Cantens and Raballand 2017. 
69  Walther 2015, Cantens et al. 2014. 
70  Cantens et al. 2014. 
71  Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone (GRSL) 2011. 
72  DFID and Crown Agents 2011. 
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and quality requirements in order to extort further informal payments. Chata men also hold 
power over traders in other ways; for example, chata men themselves reported calling border 
officials to flag traders who had spurned their services, thereby making them subject to more 
thorough examinations, delays and higher duties. Nevertheless, one form of coercion may be 
preferable to the other: indeed, a chata man explained that ‘if traders go through customs 
alone once, they won’t want to go through the hassle again’, while another chata man 
described the fear traders have of dealing with customs officials directly. In this way, both 
border officials and chata men are able to exploit information and power asymmetries.73   
 
Given the discretionary nature of these informal practices, we expect that these power 
dynamics will have disproportionately negative impacts on relatively marginalised 
populations, who may accordingly be in situations where they have to make informal 
payments and rely on chata men as a result of their inability to navigate formal processes, or 
as a result of their vulnerability to predatory extraction by state officials. Indeed, as indicated 
in Table 2, women are more likely than men to rely on chata men, likely because, as will be 
discussed below, women are more likely to face verbal, physical and sexual harassment at 
the border – but not necessarily higher costs.  
 
Table 2 Power and informality 
 Acceleration fee Goodwill Use of chata men 
Female traders 35% 
N 139 
86% 
N 142 
66% 
N 142 
Male traders 40% 
N 53 
75% 
N 55 
42% 
N 55 
 
3.3 Networks 
 
Third, we consider the role of networks and personal relationships in driving informal 
payments and brokerage. The literature highlights the importance of ethnic, social, religious, 
and kinship networks in informal cross-border trade and smuggling networks.74 Relative to 
the broader literature on informal cross-border trade, we focus to a greater degree on the 
personal relationships between border officials and traders, with the understanding that 
reshaping personal interactions between traders and customs officials – in significant part by 
reducing the scope of these interactions – has been a key feature of reform efforts for both 
tax and customs authorities. Indeed, key goals of customs and tax reforms and policies are 
to minimise personal interactions and individual discretion. This includes ASYCUDA, an 
automated system that allows data crosschecking in order to reduce the scope of corruption, 
and the frequent transfer of border officials to different border posts. While broader networks 
are pivotal in shaping informal cross-border trade more widely, human and relational factors 
are critical when focusing more specifically on the unrecorded payments that are prevalent 
within cross-border trade. Due to our narrower focus on unrecorded taxes and informal 
brokerage, we focus on three elements of the connections that may influence trading 
behaviour. 
 
First, we look at the place of residence of the traders, with the understanding that border 
officials, even if they are not from the region, integrate within border communities and 
engage in the daily life of the area. Second, we look at the frequency with which traders 
cross the border and thus develop relationships with border officials, and, third, whether 
traders have an existing personal relationship, whether social, ethnic, religious, or kin-based, 
with a border official.  
 
 
 
                                                 
73  Tegara and Johnson 2007; Titeca with Kimanuka 2012; Cantens 2012. 
74  See e.g. Meagher 1990; Roitman 1990, 2005; Twijnstra et al. 2014. 
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Table 3 Networks and informality  
 Acceleration fee Goodwill Use of chata men 
Non-residents of border community 31% 
N 131 
84% 
N 135 
70% 
N 135 
Residents of border community 48% 
N 61 
79% 
N 62 
35% 
N 62 
Traders with less frequent border 
crossings75 
31% 
N 71 
82% 
N 72 
61% 
N 72 
Traders with more frequent border 
crossings 
39% 
N 121 
83% 
N 125 
58% 
N 125 
Traders with no personal relationship with 
any border officials76 
27% 
N 59 
77% 
N 62 
71% 
N 62 
Traders with personal relationship with 
one or more border official 
41% 
N 114 
83% 
N 116 
52% 
N 116 
 
We find that residents of the border communities and those with stronger relationships with 
border officials are less likely to make use of chata men to cross the border. This 
corresponds with expectations, given the understanding of intermediaries serving to fill 
network gaps and navigate local socioeconomies.77 Indicating the importance of local 
networks to navigate informal payments, one chata man explained that he and his 
colleagues are not required to submit the necessary packing slips for examination and 
inspection, which would be a ‘suicide mission’; instead, ‘with the good and longstanding 
relationships with the inspectors and valuation officers, [we] can skip this process and 
negotiate duty.’ Unsurprisingly, non-residents, more likely to be long distance or regional 
traders, benefit most from informal brokerage systems.  
 
Interestingly, however, we see that residents of border communities are not significantly less 
likely to make goodwill payments to border officials, while they are in fact more likely to make 
acceleration fees or other forms of bribes. This is the case despite the informal duty-free 
arrangement that has been negotiated by border management communities. Likewise, those 
with greater familiarity with customs officials, whether through a personal relationship or 
greater frequency in crossing the border, are in fact more likely to make both acceleration 
fees and goodwill payments to border officials, contrary to the prediction that such 
relationships might reduce the need for informal payments. This seeming contradiction may 
be evidence that those who have stronger relationships with border officials are better able to 
negotiate directly with them. Indeed, focus group participants consistently reinforced the 
importance of personal relationships for navigating informal payments and formal customs 
processes.  
 
However, a full explanation also requires an understanding of the ways in which economic 
transactions reflect social structures and norms. Indeed, there may be social pressures for 
traders to engage in informal practices that are beneficial for officials. Likewise, border 
officials described the necessity of being sympathetic to local conditions, particularly as these 
are the people that they see in the market and in the course of daily life. Customs officials 
often explained the negotiation of rates in terms of social obligations to be sympathetic to 
local economic realities, arguing that statutory customs rates are ‘impossible’ to apply given 
local economic conditions, and the awkwardness of applying high formal rates to people 
within their adopted community. In this way, informal payments may represent a ‘moral 
economy’ in that they lessen the overall burden of duties that a trader would face in crossing 
the border. As described by Cantens and Raballand, ‘Customs administrations are flexible 
                                                 
75  ‘Less frequent’ defined as less than once a month; ‘more frequent’ defined as more than once a month. 
76  The results here are ordinal, using a measure that ranges from 0-1 based on how many types of customs officials the 
trader has a relationship with (of the most important state officials at the border: the revenue collector, examination 
officer, and customs supervisor). Nevertheless, the results are robust to using an alternative binary measure that 
indicates a relationship with at least one type of customs official (revenue collector, examination officer, or customs 
supervisor). We also experiment with a measure of familiarity with all border officials (customs officials, as well as police 
officer, police supervisor, National Revenue Authority Preventative Service and Special Division official) but familiarity 
with customs officials appears to be most important.   
77  Golub 2015; Walther 2015.  
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and tailor the fiscal burden to make it acceptable to local economic operators.’78 In addition to 
these incentives, we also find that personal relationships and the importance of social 
interactions and norms influence informal payments on both sides: traders may be more 
willing to provide direct payments to border officials they are familiar with, often describing 
sympathy for officials whose salaries may be delayed, while customs officials may be more 
likely to negotiate informally with traders who they have a relationship with or are likely to see 
around town. Accordingly, informal payments can arise out of ‘mutuality and reciprocity of 
social obligations’.79  
 
3.4 Protest 
 
Further, traders may make informal payments when they do not trust the state, when they 
are isolated from the state, or as a form of protest against the state. This may reflect a simple 
unwillingness to provide revenue to a government that is perceived to be corrupt, or may 
reflect broader disengagement from the state, with informal practices serving as a form of 
implicit protest against the state. This may be particularly relevant in Sierra Leone, where 
communities and chiefdoms in the border areas of Sierra Leone have, as described by 
Richards, ‘a long history of ambiguity about their attachment to state administrative 
structures’, with many having greater faith in chieftaincy institutions and other non-state 
actors.80  
 
While measuring trust in the state is notoriously difficult, we rely on a measure of whether 
traders are satisfied with a range of public services.81 As illustrated by table 4, we find that 
traders with greater public service satisfaction are less likely to make informal payments.  
 
Table 4 Correlation between public service satisfaction and informal practices 
 Acceleration fee Goodwill 
Public service satisfaction -0.1083 -0.0612 
 
We also explore whether informal payments are more common in Gendema, which was 
aligned with the political opposition at the time of the research, with a population that has a 
close cultural affinity to groups in neighbouring Liberia.82 At the same time, Gendema is 
comparatively isolated: while the road from Freetown to Gbalamuya is paved and in good 
condition, the road conditions from Gendema are so poor as to make travel time over even 
relatively short distances comparatively long, with the roads being virtually impassable during 
the rainy season (see table 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78  Cantens and Raballand 2017; see also Titeca and Flynn 2014. 
79  Lange 1999. 
80  Richards 1996: 46. 
81  ‘Public service satisfaction’ is a composite variable combining trader satisfaction with seven public services at the 
border: structured marketplace, public security provision, public toilets, road leading to border post, warehousing facility, 
canopy for examinations, and customs house. 
82  For example, the lingua franca is a Liberian dialect of Krio, while traders and business operators prefer to hold Liberian 
dollars, reflected by a lower black market rate for the Leone relative to the rate in Freetown. 
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Table 5 Distances and travel times from border posts83 
 Gbalamuya Gendema 
Distance Approximate 
travel time for a 
truck 
Approximate 
travel time for a 
car 
Distance Approximate 
travel time for a 
truck 
Approximate 
travel time for a 
car 
Nearest town Kambia  
11 km 
20 minutes 20 minutes Zimmi 
45 km 
3 hours 2 hours 
Nearest 
international 
airport  
Lungi 
115 km 
3 hours 2 hours Lungi 
426 km 
2 days 8 hours 
Nearest port Freetown 
185 km 
5 hours 3 hours Freetown 
386 km 
2 days 8 hours 
Nearest major 
market84 
Port Loko 
61 km 
2 hours 1 hour Pujehun 
112 km 
1 day 4 hours 
 
As described in Table 6, acceleration fees are much more common in Gendema, though the 
prevalence of goodwill payments is relatively similar across locations.  
 
Table 6 Prevalence of informal practices by border post 
 Acceleration fee Goodwill 
Traders in Gbalamuya 22% 
N 97 
84% 
N 101 
Traders in Gendema  51% 
N 95 
81% 
N 96 
 
Observational evidence supports this finding. The extraction of informal payments was more 
visible and less discreet in Gendema, with border officials making no effort to disguise 
negotiations for unrecorded taxes and operating the region as their private fiefdom. Some 
border officials in Gendema directly related their ‘right’ to levy informal payments to their 
feeling of marginalisation from the state. This feeling derived in part from their isolation from 
major transport routes and the poor condition of the road network, leaving them particularly 
isolated in rainy season and forced to transport customs revenues to headquarters via long 
okada (motorcycle taxi) rides. As being posted to a border post like Gendema is often seen 
as a form of punishment, some border officials expressed their ‘right’ to collect informal 
payments as being the least they could expect from the posting in terms of benefits. Further 
demonstrating their sense of authority in opposition to the state, a border police officer in 
Gendema related: ‘The President may control State House, but we determine what happens 
here and what we obtain from the post.’ Interestingly, then, it is state agents that openly 
rejected state authority, highlighting the critical difference between the state and its 
representatives and reinforcing the notion that peripheral regions of the state, including 
border areas, are often the sites where the realities of state authority and sovereignty are 
determined.85 The border is thus ‘a territorial and administrative expression of state 
sovereignty’ where state authority is simultaneously undermined and upheld,86 raising 
‘questions about where the state ends and anti-state resistance begins’.87  
 
3.5 Institutionalisation 
 
Underpinning these interwoven rationales for making informal payments and using informal 
brokers is the reality of the normalisation and quasi-institutionalisation of these practices. 
Forty-seven per cent of traders viewed informal payments favourably. Whether or not traders 
have positive or negative views of informality has little bearing on the strategies that they 
adopt. Instead, they appear as a highly normalised set of practices that traders can adopt 
                                                 
83  Source: Confluence, WFP  
http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.3.4+Sierra+Leone+Border+Crossing+of+Bo-Waterside 
http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/2.3.2+Sierra+Leone+Border+Crossing+of+Gbalamuya [both accessed 22 
January 2018]. 
84  Nearest location with functioning wholesale markets, or with significant manufacturing or production capacity. 
85  See e.g. Lipsky 1983. 
86  Chalfin 2001. 
87  Donnan and Wilson 1999: 106.  
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and negotiate on a pragmatic basis given their circumstances, ‘resources’ – often in the form 
of personal networks – and needs. Even those traders that report dissatisfaction with the 
current system and mistreatment at the border commonly engage in informal practices as 
they see no other option. At the same time, certain informal taxes, such as goodwill, are paid 
on a quasi-automatic basis, with over 80 per cent of traders reporting making these 
payments on a regular basis. This is consistent with the evidence collected in interviews and 
focus groups, with respondents viewing goodwill payments as a highly normalised aspect of 
cross-border trade that is important for maintaining good relations with border officials over 
time, whether or not traders pay formal customs duties.  
 
The illegality of informal economic practices simply does not have resonance in these areas: 
many traders expressed a preference for informal practices, while many others failed to 
recognise these as out of the ordinary, never mind illegal, and certainly not morally wrong. 
Traders explained that informality has become ‘the order of the day’ in cross-border trade, 
while evading official regulations may be seen as legitimate in view of the longstanding 
cross-border ties of communities.88 As Titeca and Flynn explain: ‘Legitimacy is a process 
rather than a fixed reality’. Indeed ‘there is a profound difference between norms and rules of 
formal political authority and how the participants in these transactions perceive these acts’.89  
 
Aside from this apparent normalisation, the complicity of state representatives at different 
levels of government provides evidence of the implicit acceptance and quasi-
institutionalisation of informal taxation and brokerage. Anonymous sources in Gbalamuya 
indicated not only the implicit consent of higher authorities in headquarters, but an 
expectation of receiving ‘brown envelopes’ from the informal taxes collected at the border.90 
At the same time, the informal status of chata men is well known by state representatives, 
being implicitly accepted as a means of supporting trade flows and ensuring the steady flow 
of negotiated informal payments. We thus observe ‘a complex interplay of formal and 
informal operators and practices’,91 which blurs the line of informality and reinforces the 
notion that ‘informality is a continuum rather than a dichotomy’.  92 
 
 
4  Who benefits and who loses from 
institutionalised informality? 
 
That the broad contours of the system are widely accepted and normalised does not imply 
that the impacts of that system will be equitable across different groups.93 We 
correspondingly implement a regression analysis of our survey data in order to explore the 
impacts of the described forms of informality in shaping who wins and who loses under 
existing rules. We consider a range of related outcomes that traders may face in crossing the 
border: verbal or physical harassment (harassment), sexual harassment (sexual 
harassment), imprisonment or detention (imprisonment), confiscation of goods (confiscation), 
damaged goods (damage), and requests for informal payments by border officials (informal 
payments).94 We present three primary hypotheses to explain variation in these outcomes.  
                                                 
88  This notion of the legitimacy of the evasion of regulations is also described in Flynn 1997: 234; see also Benjamin et al. 
2015. 
89  Titeca and Flynn 2014: 73. 
90  Referring to ‘brown envelopes’ is a local euphemism for accepting bribes or kickbacks.  
91  Golub 2015; Egg and Herrera 1998; Hashim and Meagher 1999. 
92  Benjamin et al. 2015; Benjamin and Mbaye 2012; see also Roitman 2005. 
93  Titeca and de Herdt 2010; Titeca with Kimanuka 2012; Schomerus and Titeca 2012; Tegara and Johnson 2007; 
Brenton et al. 2012. 
94  We do not include payments as a share of the value of goods being transported owing to two important concerns about 
data quality. As noted earlier, traders themselves seem to struggle to estimate the value of goods being transported with 
precision. Second, and more importantly, different types of goods are, in principle, subject to different formal customs 
rates – and potentially informal rates as well. As such, higher total payments may reflect differences in goods being 
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Our first hypothesis is that those who are comparatively powerful are likely to experience 
better treatment at the border. To test this possibility, we identify two groups of comparatively 
vulnerable traders who we would correspondingly expect to face less positive treatment at 
the border: female traders (gender) and small-scale traders (size). Table 7 presents 
descriptive statistics suggesting that women may be subject to greater harassment of 
different forms and of detention, while small-scale traders may face greater relative financial 
burdens (e.g. through the confiscation or damage of goods and the request for informal 
taxes). 
 
Table 7 Social power and treatment at the border 
Population sub-
section 
Verbal/ 
physical 
harassment 
(N 197) 
Sexual 
harassment 
(N 197) 
Imprisonment/ 
detainment  
(N 197) 
Confiscation of 
goods 
(N 197) 
Damaged 
goods  
(N 178) 
Requests 
for bribes/ 
informal 
taxes95  
(N 178) 
Female traders 35.2% 23.9% 25.4% 34.5% 50.4% 56.1% 
Male traders 12.7% 5.5% 14.6% 41.8% 50.9% 56.4% 
Small-scale 
traders 
31.8% 13.6% 24.2% 47.0% 57.1% 62.5% 
Large-scale 
traders  
30.7% 16.1% 19.4% 24.2% 40.4% 49.1% 
 
Our second hypothesis is that those with stronger personal relationships with customs and 
border agents are likely to experience better treatment at the border. We look at two 
indicators of the strength of the relationship with border officials: whether traders have a 
personal relationship with any customs official (familiarity)96 and whether they are residents 
of the border town (border_resident). Table 10 suggests that, in line with expectations, 
traders that have stronger networks connecting them with customs officials are less likely to 
face more negative outcomes, while being more likely to face requests for informal taxes. 
This is in line with the previous discussion, with informal payments forming a part of the 
personal and social relationships between border officials and traders.  
 
Table 8 Networks and treatment at the border 
 Verbal/ 
physical 
harassment  
(N 197) 
Sexual 
harassment 
(N 197) 
Detainment 
(N 197) 
Confiscated 
goods  
(N 197) 
Damaged 
goods  
(N 178) 
Requests 
for informal 
taxes  
(N 178) 
Traders unfamiliar with 
any customs officials 
28.9% 21.2% 19.2% 37.5% 52.9% 52.9% 
Traders familiar with one 
or more customs official 
22.4% 17.6% 17.6% 39.2% 47.3% 59.5% 
Non-residents 28.2% 23.7% 23.0% 37.8% 54.9% 55.7% 
Residents of border town 30.7% 8.1% 20.97% 33.9% 41.1% 57.1% 
 
Our final hypothesis is that those who are organised into trade associations or other unions 
are more likely to be targeted at the border, reflecting the possibility that harassment may 
serve a localised political function, with border officials seeking to assert power over trade 
associations and civic organizations that are more prone to challenging them. To test these 
propositions, we consider two variables. First, traders that are members of trade 
associations, organised to address the issues faced by traders while crossing the border 
(association), and second, traders who are more directly involved with border issues through 
involvement with a border management committee (border_management).97 Our qualitative 
                                                                                                                                                        
transported, rather than differential treatment – and seeking to account systematically for these differences is not 
possible given the extent of informality. By contrast, the variables that we include are more unambiguous indications of 
less favourable treatment. 
95  Traders were asked: ‘I am now going to list a series of challenges that you may face when crossing the border. For 
each, please tell me if this never, sometimes or often occurs.’ 
96  Includes customs revenue collector, customs examination officer and customs supervisor. 
97  Involvement includes being an inactive/active member or official leader. Each border management committee has 
representatives from the community’s youth group, women’s organisation and other civil society groups, in addition to 
political and civil servant representatives.  
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evidence suggests that these individuals are more likely to express vocal discontent about 
maltreatment. Table 9 reports descriptive statistics that suggest that members of trade 
associations and border management committees are consistently more likely to face worse 
treatment.  
 
Table 9 Control and treatment at the border 
Population sub-
section 
Verbal/ 
physical 
harassment 
(N 178) 
Sexual 
harassment 
(N 178) 
Imprisonment/ 
detainment  
(N 178) 
 
Confiscation 
of goods 
(N 178) 
Damaged 
goods  
(N 178) 
 
Requests for 
bribes/ 
informal taxes 
(N 178)  
 
Non-members of 
trade associations 
17.7% 12.0% 8.2% 17.7% 36.8% 50.6% 
Members of a trade 
association  
34.3% 31.9% 35.7% 67.6% 74.3% 75.0% 
Non-members of 
border management 
committees  
22.4% 14.4% 13.7% 23.9% 41.7% 56.9% 
Members of border 
management 
committees 
31.7% 40.0% 40.5% 85.7% 88.1% 75.0% 
 
We combine these hypotheses into a multivariate analysis to parse the most important 
factors shaping outcomes. We employ an ordered logit regression, of the form 
 
Treatmentit = a + b1*(Powerit) + b2*(Networksit) + b3*(Controlit) + eit 
 
where Treatment refers to the range of challenges or forms of mistreatment in which we are 
interested, while Power, Networks, and Control are placeholders for the alternative measures 
of our key hypotheses.98 The results of the ordered logit regression are reported in Table 10, 
while Table 11 reports the marginal effects.  
 
Table 10 Treatment at the border 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Harassment Sexual 
harassment 
Imprisonment Confiscation Damage Informal payments 
       
gender 1.242** 1.463** 0.241 -1.085** -0.511 0.0816 
 (0.497) (0.667) (0.499) (0.455) (0.414) (0.371) 
size -0.0275 0.780 0.0764 -0.772* -0.326 -0.289 
 (0.444) (0.544) (0.502) (0.465) (0.436) (0.396) 
familiarity -1.797*** -1.001 -1.098* -1.060* -1.494*** -0.209 
 (0.616) (0.637) (0.642) (0.559) (0.505) (0.435) 
border_resident  0.572 -0.650 0.170 -0.688 -0.782* 0.0265 
 (0.458) (0.587) (0.500) (0.472) (0.447) (0.397) 
association 0.999**  0.684 1.598*** 1.665*** 1.008** 1.033** 
 (0.471) (0.534) (0.539) (0.458) (0.418) (0.426) 
border_management -0.167 1.229** 0.610 2.268*** 2.019*** 0.0548 
 (0.546) (0.592) (0.548) (0.597) (0.623) (0.526) 
Constant cut1 2.222*** 3.430*** 2.470*** -0.00682 -0.568 -0.226 
 (0.628) (0.866) (0.708) (0.552) (0.547) (0.492) 
       
Observations 175 172 168 176 169 163 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98  We also experimented with the inclusion of a variety of alternative control variables but exclude them from the final 
results as they are rarely significant and have little effect on the final results. In various iterations of this regression, we 
employed measures of nationality, age, education and political connections, but found they had no significant 
relationships with treatment at the border. 
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Table 11: Marginal effects of independent variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Harassment 
Sexual 
harassment 
Imprisonment Confiscation Damage Informal payments 
 
      
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
  
     
gender (d) -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.03 0.26** 0.12 -0.02 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) 
size (d) 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 0.18* 0.08 0.07 
 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) 
familiarity 0.29*** 0.12 0.14* 0.25* 0.37*** 0.05 
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) 
border_resident (d) -0.10 0.07 -0.02 0.15 0.19* -0.01 
 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) 
association (d) -0.17** -0.09 -0.23*** -0.38*** -0.24** -0.23** 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
border_management (d) 0.03 -0.19* -0.09 -0.51*** -0.41*** -0.01 
 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) 
N 175 172 168 176 169 163 
(d) signifies that the independent variable is a binary variable moving from 0 to 1 
 
Three key results emerge from the analysis and are consistent with the discussion so far in 
emphasising the relative complexity of informal local governance, and the importance of 
social and political factors in shaping outcomes. First, and somewhat unexpectedly, we find 
limited evidence that border and customs officials consistently give favour to larger or higher 
value traders, with evidence only that traders with higher value goods have a marginally 
reduced risk of having goods confiscated. That said, evidence from our qualitative work 
suggests that larger traders experience advantages in at least some cases: for instance, 
container trucks often pay a flat minimum customs rate, regardless of the value of goods on 
board, which large traders are able to exploit. Moreover, 44 per cent of surveyed traders 
reported believing that, relative to the average trader, border officials treat traders with more 
capital or larger businesses more favourably.99    
 
The experience of female traders is more complex. On one hand, female traders are subject 
to greater verbal, physical and sexual harassment, consistent with expectations, previous 
studies, and our qualitative evidence. On the other hand, however, they are less likely to 
have their goods confiscated. This is supported by interviews and focus groups, as many 
respondents reported believing that female traders are treated better.100 This is consistent 
with some other research on the informal sector which found that, in at least some contexts, 
local moral economies may mitigate against levying higher taxes on women or otherwise 
treating them poorly, despite their vulnerability in other contexts.101 That said, the notion 
among many traders that women are treated ‘better’ seems to reflect a primacy given to 
economic considerations, and the normalisation of other kinds of threats and abuse suffered 
by female traders.   
 
Second, and consistent with other studies, we again find strong support for the importance of 
personal relationships in shaping the dynamics of border governance. Those with personal 
connections or familiarity with customs officials are less likely to face verbal or physical 
harassment, be detained, or have goods confiscated or damaged. At the same time, 
residents of border communities are less likely to have their goods damaged when crossing 
the border. This is consistent with expectations and with our findings about the determinants 
of informality: the fact that those with personal links to customs officials receive better 
                                                 
99  Fifty-two per cent of respondents reported believing the same to be true of local or national elites or ‘big men’. 
100  Sixty-four per cent of traders reported believing that there was no difference in treatment between male and female 
traders, while only 9 per cent reported believing that female traders are treated worse than men at the border.  
101  Prichard and van den Boogaard 2017. 
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treatment at the border is consistent with – and, indeed, likely explains – earlier evidence that 
they are less likely to rely on chata men.   
 
Third, the strongest results point to dramatically greater harassment, instances of 
detainment, and higher costs (whether through confiscated or damaged goods, or the levying 
of informal payments) for those who are engaged in civic groups that are related to border 
outcomes, whether through a trade association or a border management committee. These 
traders may be known to customs officials because they are involved in collective 
negotiations; because they are making frequent crossings; or because border communities 
are usually fairly small. The most compelling interpretation of this finding is that the ability of 
traders to navigate customs is not just about norms, social networks, and power, but also 
very much about the logic of control and efforts by frontline officials in border areas to assert 
their control over potential opponents. Of course, it is possible that this result could be 
spurious: it may be that those who are more politically active are better informed about their 
rights and may thus be more likely to see certain actions as harassment or mistreatment 
relative to other traders. However, both our broader survey and qualitative evidence from 
interviews corroborate the contention that those who are more politically active suffer greater 
mistreatment. This underlying reality of unequal power and the potential for coercion is 
perhaps best reflected in strong evidence that border officials tend to impose significantly 
higher burdens on those who are mobilised within civic engagement organisations. This is 
revealed by patterns in our data and is also made explicit in our survey, with 33 per cent of 
respondents agreeing that: ‘It is difficult to form organisations [such as trade associations or 
unions] at the border, as mobilisation is often perceived as being against the interest of 
frontline government officials.’ The results thus indicate that while trade associations can 
serve as a means to improve the bargaining position of vulnerable individuals, without a 
protective enabling environment these networks may also disadvantage traders. It is 
accordingly unsurprising that other indicators of mobilisation or civic action, including refusing 
to pay an informal tax to a border official, are close to nil at both border posts. While 
informality is thus highly normalised and potentially beneficial in reducing costs for some, it is 
also heavily shaped by (unequally distributed) networks, with those outside of those networks 
offered few alternatives – and significant potential costs to deviating from established local 
practices. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Understanding the determinants and outcomes of informal payments and brokerage in cross-
border trade in Sierra Leone cannot simply be explained by rationalist reasoning that focuses 
on economic motives. Economic motives are a dominant driver of informality overall but are 
insufficient for explaining specific forms of informality across groups, and the distribution of 
costs and benefits. Instead, these limited dimensions of informality can only be effectively 
understood through the complex interplay of profits, power dynamics, personal relationships, 
protest, the logic of control, and a broader set of norms.  
 
Our research allows us to draw five main conclusions. First, power dynamics and information 
asymmetries are central to understanding relationships and networks at the border, 
influencing incentives to engage in informal practices and broadly influencing the winners 
and losers of cross-border trade. Clearly, strengthening information dissemination strategies 
with regard to procedures, payments and regulations could have positive implications for 
treatment of individuals at the border, as well as improving predictability and opportunities for 
market entry and decreasing opportunities for border actors to extract rents.102 Indeed, 86 
per cent of traders reported that more public information about assessment and clearing 
                                                 
102  Brenton et al. 2012; Amin and Hoppe 2013. 
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procedures would improve their experience of crossing the border. Second, personal 
relationships are significant to both the incentives to engage in different kinds of informality 
and the treatment faced by traders at the border, with some evidence of the development of 
moral economies and mutually beneficial outcomes for border officials and traders. Third, we 
find that in some cases, state agents engage in informal practices when they feel 
marginalised from the state. In this way, we see that on-the-ground representatives of the 
state play a central role in shaping official policy, with implications for state authority and 
sovereignty. Fourth, we find evidence that border agents use their considerable discretionary 
power to maintain the status quo in their favour. Finally, social norms and the quasi-
institutionalisation of some informal practices are central to understanding economic 
interactions and governance within border regions, as well as the perceived legitimacy of 
such practices. The question for traders thus becomes not whether to engage in informal 
practices, but what specific informal strategies to adopt given their needs, constraints, and 
resources. The widespread acceptance of informal payments also raises a set of questions 
for reformers: how can the benefits of on-the-ground discretion be balanced with the negative 
outcomes resulting from a lack of oversight or consistency in application? Can the flexibility 
of informal negotiation – for instance, allowing for exemptions for small-scale traders whose 
cultural and social lives traverse borders – be formalised in a way that makes these practices 
more transparently uniform and fair, and less easily exploited? Can informal moral 
economies be balanced so that they do not simply reflect the ‘informalisation of privilege’?103 
 
Our initial findings point to the need for deeper exploration of these questions, as well as a 
deeper exploration of the various indicators found to be significant for understanding the 
determinants and outcomes of informal payments and brokerage. For instance, while our 
exploration of personal relationships is important to understanding the psychology and social 
norms embedded within, and influencing behaviour and treatment in, economic transactions, 
the analysis would be strengthened by a further exploration of the ethnic, religious, and 
kinship networks that have been found to be important elsewhere. Moreover, comparatively 
little is known about the interactions between trade-related associations and border officials. 
Our evidence suggests that such organisations may hold opportunities for traders but may 
equally pose risks. Our research points to potential downsides of putting one’s head above 
the parapet, but deeper research is required to better understand the dynamics of this 
relationship and how negative outcomes may be overcome.  
 
Underpinning these conclusions is a conceptual shift away from a normative understanding 
of informality as legal or illegal, and towards a perspective that starts from the reality of 
existing practices and the sociopolitical contexts in which they are embedded, seeking to 
improve outcomes from that initial foundation. Ultimately, reforms should aim to work ‘with 
the grain’ of existing informal economic practices and networks, adapting to an existing 
context and extending the realm of governance from formal domains of professionalised 
decision making into everyday economic interactions.104 
 
  
                                                 
103  Portes, Castells and Benton 1989: 289. 
104  Booth 2011, Booth 2012, Cleaver et al. 2013. 
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